Text | Frontline Art Editor | Li Chengxi Producer | Niudao Finance (niudaocaijing)

Others worry about deposits, Guiyang Bank worries about having no place to spend money.

After the release of the 2025 third quarter report, Guiyang Bank directly ranks as the “last” among A-share city commercial banks:

Revenue down 13.73% year-on-year, net profit down 1.39% year-on-year, becoming the only “double decline” among 17 listed city commercial banks.

(Source: Guiyang Bank 2025 Q3 Report)

It’s worth noting that, with 435 billion in deposits and a loan-deposit spread of 89.2 billion, nearly 90 billion in funds are idle with nowhere to be invested. The “money bag” accumulated from high-interest savings in the past has instead become a burden crushing performance. Guiyang Bank is pushing forward under pressure, and the dilemma needs urgent resolution.

High-interest savings

While state-owned and joint-stock banks are canceling large-term deposits of five years or more, Guiyang Bank still offers high-interest products on its app labeled “January - 5 years,” with an annual interest rate of up to 2.15%, significantly higher than peers.

This “fundraising tool” really works.

(Source: Guiyang Bank 2025 Q3 Report)

Since going public in 2016, Guiyang Bank’s personal deposits accounted for only 19.25%, but by the end of September 2025, it soared to 53.86%, with personal fixed deposits reaching 187.3 billion, accounting for 43% of total deposits.

Total deposits jumped from 262.9 billion to 435 billion, a 65% increase over ten years, looking very impressive.

But nothing is free. Behind high interest rates are visible cost pressures.

(Source: Guiyang Bank 2025 Q3 Report)

In the first three quarters of 2025, Guiyang Bank’s net interest income decreased by 12.28% year-on-year, and net interest margin shrank to 1.57%, 0.23 percentage points lower than 2024.

It’s important to note that the reasonable range for bank net interest margin is 1.8%. Guiyang Bank has long fallen below the warning line, and this is only barely maintained by reducing 1.6 billion in interest expenses.

Additionally, “loan-deposit imbalance” is a concern.

Deposits reached 435 billion, but loans were only 345.7 billion, with nearly 90 billion sitting idle without generating income.

Banks rely on interest margins to survive; borrowed deposits require interest payments, and money that cannot be lent out is a loss-making business.

Asset quality warning lights

Performance decline is just a surface issue; Guiyang Bank’s asset quality has long been riddled with problems.

(Source: Guiyang Bank 2025 Q3 Report)

As of the end of September 2025, non-performing loans (NPLs) soared to 5.648 billion, a new high since listing, with the NPL ratio at 1.63%, higher than at the end of 2024.

More dangerously, special mention loans increased by 900 million, rising to 3.17%, with substandard, doubtful, and loss loans all increasing, like a pile of mines ready to explode at any moment.

At this critical juncture, Guiyang Bank is still “removing safety cushions.”

(Source: Guiyang Bank 2025 Q3 Report)

Provision coverage ratio dropped from 257.07% at the end of 2024 to 239.59%. Among listed banks in 2025, Hangzhou Bank’s coverage ratio remains high at 502%, and Ningbo Bank at 373%.

Against the backdrop of record-high NPLs, reducing provisions is akin to going naked. If the NPL ratio continues to rebound, profits are likely to be significantly reversed.

(Source: Guiyang Bank 2025 Q3 Report)

Non-interest income is even more dire: net fee and commission income down 8.52%, fair value change losses of 890 million, and the so-called “other business income” surging by 825% are exposed as “one-time gains to boost the scene.”

The only bright spot is a 34.2% increase in investment income, with the additional 558 million unable to fill the gap in net interest income.

Union Credit Rating has issued an early warning: “The bank’s asset quality shows a downward trend, with an increase in special mention loans, and ongoing concern is needed.”

In short, this is no longer just performance fluctuation but a fundamental deterioration.

Shareholders are not happy

Struggling to make ends meet, Guiyang Bank still insists on “doing good.”

At the November 2025 shareholders’ meeting, a proposal to “acquire loss-making village banks” drew nearly 128 million opposing votes, with dissent among small and medium shareholders reaching 27.23%, a recent high.

It’s worth noting that the acquired Xifeng Development Village Bank lost 3.32 million in the first half of 2025, and its shares are under judicial freeze—an obvious ticking time bomb.

What’s more frustrating for shareholders is that Guiyang Bank’s three village banks it holds stakes in, two are losing money:

Guangyuan Gui Shang Village Bank lost 8 million, Xifeng Development lost 3.32 million, only one made 840,000, with total losses exceeding 10 million. During a period of poor performance, using shareholders’ money to fill others’ holes—no wonder small shareholders are furious.

Meanwhile, compliance risks are also emerging.

In early 2026, two of its branches were fined 200,000 for “improper loan management,” and the market value has evaporated by 7 billion since the first day of listing, with the stock price down 2% for the year. On one side, poor performance; on the other, reckless spending and violations of compliance—Guiyang Bank’s operations are truly baffling to investors.

In the context of shrinking net interest margins and regulatory “price wars,” Guiyang Bank still clings to the old tactic of “high-interest savings.” The result is that more deposits mean greater loss pressure; when asset quality worsens, instead of tightening risk controls, it acquires loss-making village banks; shareholder interests are ignored, and strategic decisions are severely disconnected from operational realities.

The survival of regional banks is never about who offers higher interest but about who can survive steadily.

Chengdu Bank, with a third-quarter revenue of 17.76 billion and net profit of 9.49 billion in 2025, also a regional bank, shows a stark contrast. The key is that they maintain a “balance of volume and price,” avoiding self-destruction in low-level competition.

(Source: Guiyang Bank 2025 Q3 Report)

Guiyang Bank’s 435 billion in deposits must either quickly find quality lending channels to put the money to good use or cut interest rates to control costs and survive with a broken arm.

No matter how much money there is, lying idle will eventually be eaten away by inflation and losses.