He Wan Nan: Vanke's Glory Fades, Stock Price Falls to the Bottom

Ask AI · How Vanke’s High-Leverage Model Led to Massive Losses?

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■ He Wannan

This Tuesday, Vanke released its 2025 annual report, showing a huge loss of 885.56B yuan; by this Friday, the company’s stock price had already fallen to 3.82 yuan.

Among more than 5,400 A-share listed companies, Vanke is the only company—among Shenzhen’s “Old Five Stocks” and Shanghai’s “Old Eight Stocks”—that still retains its original name and continues its core business. In January 2018, Vanke topped the global real estate industry with a market value of 4662.94B yuan. Today, its market value has fallen to 430B yuan ( including A+H shares ), down by more than 90%.

The 2025 annual report shows that Vanke’s net profit attributable to shareholders was -885.56B yuan, including credit impairment losses of 341.74B yuan and asset impairment losses of 219.29B yuan; together, the two totaled 561.03B yuan, accounting for 63.35% of the total net loss.

Vanke’s annual reports over the years show that the company’s “other receivables” are as high as more than 2000B yuan. After provisioning 337B yuan by the end of 2025, there still remains 1754B yuan.

In 2015, former Vanke president Zhu Jiusheng personally created and effectively controlled BoShang Asset Management Co., Ltd. ( (hereinafter “BoShang Asset Management”) ) and Shenzhen Pengjin Internet Financial Services Co., Ltd. ( (hereinafter “Pengjin”) ). Then, led by BoShang Asset Management and Pengjin, they built multiple “cooperative companies.” They also established a capital pool through these cooperative companies and went on a spree of acquiring land at high prices. Here, the capital pool includes bank wealth-management funds, trust plans, insurance funds, and even “employee co-investments.”

According to statistics, the capital pool’s scale rapidly expanded from 300B yuan in 2019 to over 1000B yuan in 2021; meanwhile, BoShang Asset Management’s registered capital is 100M yuan, which leveraged off-balance-sheet financing of more than 1000B yuan, with a leverage ratio as high as 1000 times. This is what is known as “Shadow Vanke.”

During real estate’s boom cycle, the “Shadow Vanke” leveraged to the extreme delivered high returns to Vanke’s management and related cooperative counterparties. Relevant filings disclose that the total compensation of former Vanke chairman Yu Liang in the 2019 annual report was 12.517M yuan; after tax, the economic profit bonus was 22.18M yuan, for a total of 34.697M yuan; Zhu Jiusheng’s CEO compensation from 2018 to 2020 remained steady between 11.23M yuan and 11.27M yuan; and Wang Shi voluntarily gave up retirement pension benefits of tens of millions of yuan starting in 2023.

In 2021, when the “three red lines” were implemented and the financing environment tightened, the funding chain of the BoShang-related platform system broke; cooperative counterparties could not repay Vanke’s receivables. Vanke’s receivables instantly turned into “bad debts.” In 2023, credit impairment began to surge—impairment of 264B yuan. In 2025, impairment increased again to 341.74B yuan.

As for asset impairment losses of 219.29B yuan, they mainly came from inventory impairment, which was also formed through high-price land acquisitions arranged by “Shadow Vanke.”

Most fatal of all, Vanke’s credit risk and high-priced land risk overlapped with each other. From 2017 to 2021, Vanke’s cumulative land-acquisition amount reached 5549B yuan. Among them, the floor price in 2017 was as high as 7908 yuan per square meter, and in 2021 it still stood at 6942 yuan per square meter—far above the industry average.

The double blow from both credit impairment and inventory impairment ultimately caused Vanke’s net assets to drop sharply from 2026.66B yuan at the end of 2024 to 1169B yuan, shrinking by nearly half.

Back then, Vanke’s stock price had once hit as high as 42.24 yuan; today, the A-share price is only 3.82 yuan, and the H-share price is just 2.88 HKD—only about one-third of its net assets (9.80 yuan ).

In 2017, Shenzhen Metro took over Vanke. By injecting equity of 663.7B yuan ( to acquire 27.18% of the Vanke shares held by China Resources and Evergrande ), Shenzhen Metro’s market value has since evaporated by over 500B yuan (, with the share price falling from the cost price of 20.47 yuan to 3.82 yuan ). During that period, Shenzhen Metro also provided Vanke with cumulative shareholder loans exceeding 307B yuan to help Vanke repay debts. Shenzhen Metro, which used to be a profitability benchmark earning over 10B yuan annually, turned into a loss-making enterprise. In 2024, Shenzhen Metro’s net loss was 334.61B yuan; in the first half of 2025, it lost another 33.61B yuan, wiping out the total profits from the previous five years (273B yuan ).

In October 2025, Zhu Jiusheng was placed under criminal coercive measures for alleged embezzlement of funds and transfer of benefits; the investigation focus centered on the operation of the BoShang Asset Management, Pengjin, and other platforms under his purview. In January 2026, Yu Liang, who had been steering Vanke for 36 years, reached retirement age and stepped down from all positions; his decision-making responsibility regarding the BoShang-related platform system is still under investigation.

Shenzhen Metro tried to keep Vanke alive through measures such as shareholder loans and bond guarantees, but Vanke’s path to recovery is fraught with thorns—just as the auditors emphasized in the annual report: Vanke’s loss for the current year is 886B yuan; interest-bearing liabilities due within one year total 1606B yuan; and the company currently has cash of 615B yuan, indicating the existence of major uncertainties that may lead to significant doubts about Vanke’s ability to continue operating.

Editor | Li Li

Reviewer | Wang Wei